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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This court previously vacated one of the two counts of 
conviction of Nelson Diaz under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because 
it was not based on a second predicate offense.  On remand to 
the District Court for resentencing, the District Court rejected 
Diaz’s contention that it was required to merely subtract the 
120-month sentence associated with the vacated count.  The 
Court held that it was permitted to resentence de novo.  Diaz 
appeals and the case is now before the same panel of judges 
who vacated Diaz’s sentence in the first instance.  In addition, 
we directed the parties to address the Supreme Court’s recent 




Nelson Diaz was convicted by a jury of possession 
with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.  
§ 841(a)(1) and two counts of possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C.  
§ 924(c).  In crafting the original sentence, the District Court 
was guided by § 4B1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
Section 4B1.1(c) provides that for a defendant convicted of 
multiple counts, at least one of which is a conviction other 
than § 924(c), the applicable Guideline range is the greater of 
“the guideline range that results by adding the mandatory 
minimum consecutive penalty required by the 18 U.S.C.  
§ 924(c) . . . count(s) to the minimum and the maximum of 
the otherwise applicable guideline range” for the non- 
§ 924(c) count(s) of conviction, or 360 months to life.  In 
other words, § 4B1.1(c) provides a floor Guideline range of 
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360 months to life for career offenders convicted of at least 
one § 924(c) count.
1
     
 
Pursuant to this provision, the District Court 
determined, and the parties agreed, that the applicable 
Guideline range was the default Guideline of 360 to life.  
With this range in mind, the District Court evaluated the  
§ 3553(a) factors and declined to vary from the Guideline 
range.  Accordingly, the District Court imposed a sentence of 
480 months—the sum of the 240-month sentence for the  
§ 841(a)(1) distribution offense and ten years (or 120 months) 
for each of the two § 924(c) counts.  This sentence was within 
the Guideline range of 360 years to life.  Defense counsel 
objected to the imposition of a sentence on the second  
§ 924(c) count on double jeopardy grounds but the District 
Court denied Diaz’s objection.   
 
Diaz appealed the conviction and sentence associated 
with the second § 924(c) firearm count.  This court in Diaz I 
agreed with Diaz and held that the second § 924(c) count 
must be based on a separate underlying drug offense.  United 
States v. Diaz, 592 F.3d 467, 475 (3d Cir. 2010) (Diaz I).   
 
We discussed our remedy for the double jeopardy 
violation on two occasions in the opinion.  At the conclusion 
of the discussion section on the double jeopardy claim, we 
stated, “[f]or the reasons set forth, we will vacate one of 
Diaz’s two § 924(c) convictions and remand to the District 
Court for resentencing.  See [United States v.] Taylor, 13 F.3d 
[986,] 994 [6th Cir. 1994)] (prescribing the appropriate 
remedy in this context).”  Diaz I, 592 F.3d at 475.  Then, in 
the concluding section of the opinion, we stated, “[f]or the 
reasons set forth . . . [w]e will vacate one of the two § 924(c) 
violations and remand this case to the District Court for 
resentencing.”  Id. at 476.   
                                              
1
 Under § 3E1.1 and § 4B1.1(c)(3) this default or floor 
Guideline range for career offenders convicted of at least 
one § 924(c) count can be reduced if the defendant 
accepted responsibility.  These modifications are not 
relevant here because Diaz did not accept responsibility.   
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On remand, Diaz contended that this language in  
Diaz I was a specific instruction to nullify or subtract the  
120-month sentence associated with the vacated § 924(c) 
conviction.  The District Court rejected this contention and 
held that because the original sentence treated the counts of 
conviction as interdependent, de novo sentencing was 
appropriate so long as the remanding court did not 
specifically direct otherwise.  The District Court held that the 
language from Diaz I did not amount to a specific instruction 
to merely subtract 120 months from the original sentence.  
Accordingly, the District Court resentenced Diaz de novo.   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that one of the § 924(c) 
counts had been vacated, the applicable Guideline range 
under § 4B1.1 was still 360 to life.  However, the District 
Court refused the government’s request to impose an identical 
480-month sentence.  The District Court explained that “the 
Third Circuit’s mandate has to mean something besides that I 
simply cookie cutter resentence you to the same term of 
imprisonment that you had.”  App. at 113.  In other words, 
the District Court believed it was necessary “to give some 
consideration to the fact that we’re dealing with one less 
conviction here.”  App. at 115.   
 
Although the District Court noted that the second  
§ 924(c) conviction was vacated, it held that “that doesn’t 
mean that I can’t take cognizance of the behavior, the conduct 
for the purposes of sentencing, and I must do that even 
though technically the conviction ceases to stand.”  App. at 
111.  Accordingly, based largely on the fact that there was 
one less conviction, the Court reduced Diaz’s sentence from 
the original 480 months to 400 months—comprised of 240 
months on the distribution offense and 160 months on the 
sole § 924(c) offense.   
 
Prior to announcing the new sentence, the District 
Court heard from Diaz, his brother, and his attorney, who 
argued that since being incarcerated, Diaz had taken 
advantage of rehabilitation programs and was “trying to better 
[himself].”  App. at 105. The Sentencing Memorandum 
submitted on Diaz’s behalf explained in more detail the 
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rehabilitation efforts Diaz was making.  Specifically, he had 
enrolled in a GED program, computer training class, and had 
received certificates in environmental services and custodial 
maintenance.  Custodial records also indicated that Diaz was 
interacting well with prison staff and other inmates.  The 
District Court recognized “that the defendant has attempted to 
better himself and has a commendable record during his 
period of incarceration, which is fine as far as it goes, but 
doesn’t really figure much in my calculus at this point.”  App. 
at 109.  No revised presentence report was prepared by 
probation for the resentencing proceeding.  Diaz again 
appeals. 
   
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  To the extent it is alleged 
that the District Court made errors of law, our review is 
plenary.  United States v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 321 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Otherwise, our review of a criminal sentence is for 
abuse of discretion.  Id. 
   
III. 
 
A. The propriety of de novo resentencing 
 
In United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 181-82 (3d 
Cir. 2010), this court held that “[w]hen a conviction for one 
or more interdependent counts is vacated on appeal, the 
resentencing proceeding conducted on remand is de novo 
unless we specifically limit the district court’s authority.”  
Miller was originally convicted and sentenced for one count 
of knowingly receiving child pornography and one count of 
knowingly possessing it.  Id. at 175.  We vacated one of the 
sentences because it violated double jeopardy and amounted 
to multiple punishments for the same offense.  Id. at 176.  The 
district court had originally grouped the child pornography 
counts and sentenced Miller to 46 months as prescribed by  
§ 3D1.2(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. at 180.  Because 
the original sentence was based on a Guideline provision that 
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grouped the counts together, we held that “[i]n recalculating 
Miller’s offense level for the [remaining] count, the District 
Court could not rely on a discrete sentence previously 
imposed for that offense.  Instead, the District Court had to 
ungroup the two offenses and determine the base offense 
level applicable to the [remaining] count alone.”  Id. at 181.  
Thus, we held that “counts that were grouped pursuant to the 
Sentencing Guidelines at the original sentencing are 
interdependent, such that the vacation of one of the grouped 
counts requires a de novo sentencing on remand unless we 
direct otherwise.”  Id. at 182.   
 
In addition to grouping under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, we have noted other indicia of interdependence.  
In United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 1997), 
we held that “when a defendant is found guilty on a 
multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the 
district court will craft a disposition in which the sentences on 
the various counts form part of an overall plan.  When a 
conviction on one or more of the component counts is 
vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free 
to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original 
plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon 
remand . . . if that appears necessary in order to ensure that 
the punishment still fits both crime and criminal.”   
 
Davis also dealt with the vacation of a § 924(c) count 
and we held that the § 924(c) count and underlying offense 
“are interdependent and result in an aggregate sentence, not 
sentences which may be treated discretely.”  Id. at 121.  We 
noted that “[t]he end result of this policy must be that where a 
sentencing judge imposed a multicount sentence aware that a 
mandatory consecutive sentence is to be tacked on to it and 
the mandatory sentence is later stricken, the judge is entitled 
to reconsider the sentence imposed on the remaining counts.”  
Id. at 122 (quotations and citations omitted).   
 
That is precisely what happened in this case—the 
District Court originally thought it was required to impose a 
sentence on the second § 924(c) count (albeit not a 25-year 
mandatory sentence), and that count was eventually stricken.  
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Accordingly, the Court originally imposed an interdependent 
sentence and, on remand, was permitted to resentence the 
remaining counts de novo.   
 
An examination of the Sentencing Guidelines that 
governed Diaz’s original sentence and the sentencing hearing 
itself confirm that this was an interdependent sentence.  As 
outlined above, § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines 
contemplates grouped or interdependent sentences for each  
§ 924(c) offense and the underlying offense, similar to the 
Guideline at issue in Miller.  Specifically, § 4B1.1(c) requires 
the sentencing judge to add the Guideline range for the 
underlying drug offense to the mandatory minimums 
associated with each § 924(c) count and then compare that 
range to the default career offender range of 360 to life.  
Accordingly, although the Guideline range that was actually 
applied to Diaz both originally and on remand was 360 to life, 
in settling upon that range the District Court had to compare it 
to a composite range based on the combination of each count.  
Therefore, the sentence bears a direct relationship under the 
Guidelines to a consecutively constructed Guideline range 
that considers each of the offenses and builds one on top of 
the other.  The fact that the default 360 to life was longer than 
the consecutively constructed Guideline sentence does not 
negate the interdependence of the sentence.  As the District 
Court explained when originally sentencing Diaz within the 
Guideline range, “4B1.1 was directly intended to contemplate 
circumstances like this.”  App. at 56.   
 
The sentencing colloquy also demonstrates that the 
sentences were interdependent.  When defense counsel 
objected to a consecutive sentence being imposed on the 
second § 924(c) count, the government attorney suggested 
that “the Court had in its mind a sentencing scheme” and 
suggested that the District Court merely restructure the 
sentence so as not to impose a consecutive sentence on the 
second § 924(c) count.  App. at 61.  The Court specifically 
affirmed that it had a sentencing scheme in mind—indicating 




Based on the applicable Guidelines, the sentencing 
colloquy, and the contingent nature of the § 924(c) offense, 
the sentences in this case were interdependent.  Therefore, 
absent specific instructions to the contrary, the District Court 
appropriately resentenced Diaz de novo.  Thus, we turn to 
whether there was any such instruction.   
 
Diaz contends that the reference in Diaz I to the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 986, 994 
(6th Cir. 1994), with a parenthetical description of Taylor as 
“prescribing” the “appropriate remedy” on remand, 
unambiguously dictated limited resentencing.  In Taylor, as 
we did in Diaz I, the Sixth Circuit vacated a second § 924(c) 
conviction because it was not based on a second underlying 
predicate offense.  Id.  In issuing its remedy, the Sixth Circuit 
“remand[ed] to the district court with an order to vacate [the 
defendant’s] conviction and sentence on the second [§ 924(c) 
count].”  Id.  The Court directed that the defendant, “should 
remain sentenced to 27 months on Count 1 [the drug 
trafficking count], and to 5 years on the single § 924(c)(1) 
conviction.”  Id.   
 
There is no question that Taylor involved an explicit 
instruction regarding what the new sentence should be on 
remand.  However, a mere “see” citation to a case from 
another circuit, even with an explanatory parenthetical, does 
not constitute the kind of specific limitation that we held was 
necessary to overcome the default de novo standard we 
established in Miller.  In contrast, in Diaz I we provided a 
very general instruction, stating that “we remand this case to 
the District Court for resentencing.”  592 F.3d at 476.  If we 
had intended the District Court to simply subtract the 120-
month sentence associated with the vacated count, we could 
have easily so stated.  We did not.  Accordingly, the District 
Court correctly concluded that we did not limit its ability to 
resentence de novo and that because the original sentence 
contained interdependent counts, de novo resentencing was 
permitted.
2
   
                                              
2
 In so holding, we are careful to note, as we did in 
Miller, that we take no position on whether de novo 
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B. Post-sentencing rehabilitation 
 
Having concluded that de novo resentencing was 
appropriate on remand, we turn to Diaz’s alternative 
argument:  that the District Court failed to fully consider 
Diaz’s post-incarceration rehabilitation.  Subsequent to the 
resentencing hearing, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011), which 
controls our analysis.   
 
Pepper was originally sentenced to 24-months 
imprisonment, which represented a significant downward 
departure from the Guideline range.  The government 
appealed the sentence and the Eighth Circuit held that the 
sentencing judge ignored the Guidelines and impermissibly 
departed out of a “desire to sentence [the defendant] to the 
shortest possible term of imprisonment that would allow him 
to participate in the intensive drug treatment program at the 
federal prison.”  United States v. Pepper, 412 F.3d 995, 999 
(8th Cir. 2005) (Pepper I).   
 
On remand, the district court again sentenced Pepper 
to 24-months imprisonment, this time based largely on 
Pepper’s rehabilitation while incarcerated.  The Eighth 
Circuit once more reversed, holding that “evidence of 
[defendant]’s post-sentencing rehabilitation is not relevant 
and will not be permitted at resentencing because the district 
court could not have considered that evidence at the time of 
the original sentencing.”  United States v. Pepper, 486 F.3d 
408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (Pepper II).  
 
The Supreme Court reversed, and held that the district 
court was permitted to sentence de novo and consider the 
defendant’s post-incarceration rehabilitation.  Pepper, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1236.  The Supreme Court emphasized that sentencing 
judges exercise wide discretion in the types of evidence they 
may consider when imposing a sentence and that, consistent 
                                                                                                     
resentencing is the default approach after a count 
contained in a non-interdependent sentence has been 
vacated.  See Miller, 594 F.3d at 180.   
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with that discretion, no restrictions should be placed on the 
district court’s ability to consider evidence of post-
incarceration rehabilitation.  Id. at 1235-36.   
 
Because Pepper was not announced until after the 
District Court had resentenced Diaz, the court could not have 
known that it was permitted to consider Diaz’s post-
sentencing rehabilitation consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pepper.  As outlined above, Diaz and his attorney 
both explained at the resentencing hearing that Diaz had a 
positive record since he had been incarcerated and was 
attempting to better himself.  The District Court did in fact 
permit the defense to offer additional evidence at the 
resentencing without restricting the nature of the evidence it 
could proffer.  Nonetheless, the District Court said that Diaz’s 
rehabilitation “is fine as far as it goes, but doesn’t really 
figure much in my calculus at this point.”  App. at 109.  
Arguably, as the government contends, this language 
indicates that the District Court did, in fact, weigh the 
evidence of rehabilitation but concluded it was not, in the 
end, worth much.  Just as likely, Diaz’s rehabilitation did not 
“figure much” into the calculus because the District Court 
was unsure that rehabilitation was something courts should or 
could actively consider while resentencing.   
 
This latter view gains credence when one considers 
prevailing circuit case law and Guideline provisions at the 
time of resentencing which, in contrast to Pepper, limited a 
district court’s consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation.  
In United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1997), we held 
that “post-offense rehabilitation efforts, including those which 
occur post-conviction, may constitute a sufficient factor 
warranting a downward departure provided that the efforts are 
so exceptional as to remove the particular case from the 
heartland in which the acceptance of responsibility guideline 
was intended to apply.”   
 
However, subsequent to Sally, in 2000, the Sentencing 
Guidelines were amended to include § 5K2.19, which 
provides that “[p]ost-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, even if 
exceptional, undertaken by a defendant after imposition of a 
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term of imprisonment for the instant offense are not an 
appropriate basis for a downward departure when 
resentencing the defendant for that offense.”  This revision, in 
force at the time of Diaz’s resentencing, seems to negate the 
already narrow circumstances under which courts could 
consider post-sentencing rehabilitation under our decision in 
Sally.  Moreover, in United States v. Lloyd, 469 F.3d 319, 325 
(3d Cir. 2006), we affirmed the validity of § 5K2.19 and held 
that courts should not consider a defendant’s post-sentencing 
rehabilitation efforts when resentencing except in “unusual” 
cases.   
 
The Supreme Court in Pepper specifically addressed  
§ 5K2.19, dismissed it as merely advisory and questioned the 
validity of the policy rationales motivating limitations on 
post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence.  131 S. Ct. at 1247-
48.  Accordingly, to the extent that the District Court was 
aware of the limitations we had imposed on consideration of 
post-sentencing rehabilitation in Lloyd and Sally and relied on 
those limitations, that reliance was erroneous in light of 
Pepper.  The government conceded as much at oral argument 
when it agreed that Lloyd’s continuing validity was thrown 
into question by Pepper.
3
  The fact that no revised 
                                              
3
  Importantly, we note, as the Supreme Court did in 
Pepper, that to the extent that a court remands for a 
limited resentencing proceeding, and not a de novo 
proceeding, limitations on the consideration of post-
sentencing rehabilitation may continue to be appropriate.  
See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1249 n.17.  In that vein, it is 
worth noting that Lloyd itself dealt with a remand pursuant 
to Booker, and, in that context, the exclusion of post-
sentencing rehabilitative evidence may still be proper—an 
issue we need not reach here.  This subtle distinction may 
not have been discerned by the District Court who could 
have nevertheless been guided by Lloyd.  Indeed, the 
distinction between a limited Booker remand and de novo 
remand seems to have made little difference to the 
Supreme Court, which cited Lloyd as emblematic of the 
circuit split regarding the role of post-sentencing 
rehabilitation evidence.  Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1239 n.6.   
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presentence report was prepared documenting any alleged 
post-incarceration rehabilitation further supports a conclusion 
that the issue of rehabilitation was not fully considered.   
 
Given the ambiguity in the record, the interests of 
justice demand that we remand (yet again) to the District 
Court so that Diaz and the District Court have every 
opportunity to take counsel from the Supreme Court’s 
instructions in Pepper:  that is, that evidence of post-
sentencing rehabilitation may be considered when 
resentencing de novo.  The marginal effect of our decision 
may be slim and the District Court may conclude that no 
alteration of the sentence is necessary.  But, out of an 
abundance of caution and due deference to the Supreme 
Court’s clear instructions in Pepper, we vacate the judgment 
of sentence imposed by the District Court and remand for a de 
novo resentencing proceeding including full consideration of 




For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of sentence and remand to the District Court for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.   
 
                                                                                                     
 
We also note that Pepper, Sally and § 5K2.19 deal 
with requests for downward departures or variances based 
on post-sentence rehabilitation, whereas Diaz primarily 
urged a sentence at the bottom of the applicable Guideline 
range.  Because the relief Diaz seeks is less extraordinary, 
post-sentencing rehabilitation should be considered.  Nor 
does Pepper indicate that evidence of post-sentencing 
rehabilitation is only relevant to requests for downward 
departures or variances.  See id. at 1236.  Instead, Pepper 
discusses the importance of post-sentencing rehabilitation 
in the context of evaluating the § 3553(a) factors which, in 
addition to controlling whether a variance should be 
granted, also determine where within a Guideline range a 
defendant should be sentenced.  Id. at 1247.   
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